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Monetary Policy and Velocity
Duringthe first quarterof 1985, total spending on
goods and services-Gross National Productor
GNP-ran at an annual rate of$3,817 billion. At
the same time, the stock ofmoney (M1, which
consists ofcurrency and checkable deposits)
averaged $568 billion. Thus, the income velocity
of money-the numberoftimes each dollarwas
used in buyingthe nation'soutput-was 6.7 at an
annual rate in the first quarter. This was a slightly
slower rate ofturnoverthan that recorded in the
last quarter of 1984.
The Federal Reserve System uses its control over
the total amountofmoney circulating in the
economyto influence the overall level ofspend-
ing, oraggregate demand, in the economy. This
influence on spending in turn allows the Fed
indirectly to affectthe level ofeconomic activity
and the rate ofinflation. However, as the numbers
in the first paragraph show, money's influence on
the level ofaggregate demand depends notonly
on the amountofmoney circulating in the econ-
omy but also on the speed with which itcircu-
lates-in other words, its velocity.
Thus, in setting its monetary targets, the Fed must
take intoaccounthowvelocity is likelyto behave.
Failure to do so might make monetary policy in-
advertently looserortighter than intended ifvelo-
city increases more or less rapidly than expected.
Velocity and money demand
Obviously, the easier it is to predictchanges in
velocity, theeasier itis toset monetarytargets that
are consistent with the Fed's ultimate goals of
stable prices, highemploymentand steadygrowth.
To economists, this issue ofpredictabilityor "sta-
biIity" ofvelocity, as it is often called, resolves
itself into an issue ofhow stable is the behaviorof
the public with respect to the amountofcash
balances itwants to keep on hand for transactions
and other purposes. Or in economists' jargon, the
issue is one ofthe stability of money demand.
The reason forthis is that the velocity ofmoney is
inversely related tothe demand formoney. A velo-
cityofsix, for example, means that each dollar is
spent six times a year so that the public's holdings
ofmoney, on average, are equal totwomonths(or
one sixth ofa year) oftotal spending. Thus, ifthe
public chooses to hold a larger quantity ofmoney
relative to its expenditures, the velocity ofmoney
declines; conversely, a reduction in money
demand relative to spending orGNP means an
increase in velocity.
Statistical investigation ofthe public's money
demand behavior absorbed a substantial share of .
economists' research efforts in the period after
World WarII. By theearly 70s, itwas widely, ifnot
universally, agreed thattheparametersofthis rela-
tionshipwere relativelystableovertime, allowing
them to be estimated with a fair degree of preci~
sion, which in turn provided the basis for reason-
ably accurate predictions ofmoney demand. Thus,
money demand-and by implication velocity-
appeared stable enough to make monetary target-
ing aviable strategy for Federal Reserve policy.
The great decline of '82
As Chart 1 shows, the findingthat the public's
average behaviorwith regard to its moneyholdings
was relatively stable did not mean that velocity
growth did notvary from quarterto quarter. This
short-run variabilityofvelocity is one reason why
the Fed establishes its targets on an annual basis.
However, over longer periods oftime, as Chart 2
indicates, velocity during most ofthe post-war
period grew at a relatively stable rate ofgrowth of
between 3.0 to 3.5 percent. This secular upswing
was widely attributed to the abilityofhouseholds
and businesses to exploiteconomies ofscale in
managing their cash balances. As a result, the
public's demand for money increased less rapidly
than overall economic activity, causing velocity
on averagetorise. In 1982, however, this long-run
upswing was abruptly reversed; overthe six quar-
ters from the lastquarterof1981 tothe firstquarter
of 1983 velocity declined at an average annual
rate of4.8 percent, aphenomenon unprecedented
since the Great Depression.
By the third quarterof 1982, after several quarters
ofdeclining velocity, itappeared more and more
certain thatthedeclineswere nottemporaryaber-
rations that would soon reverse themselves. Con-
sequently, it appeared more and more likelythat
monetary policy was running the risk ofbeingFRBSF
inadvertentlytoo tight as the continuing declines
in velocity translated into anemic growth in GNP.
Finally, with increased uncertainty aboutthe link
between money and GNP posed by velocity's
unusual behavior, and in the face ofpersistent
weakness in both the domestic and international
economies, the Fed in October 1982 de-empha-
sized its targets for M1.
Financial deregulation and moneydemand
Although velocity growth has resumed since mid-
1983, this entire episode raises the more funda-
mental issue ofwhether velocity has become
permanentlymoreunstable. Permanent instability
wouId reopen the whole question ofwhether tar-
geting growth in a monetary aggregate is a viable
way ofconducting monetary policy.
In the eyes ofsome economists, the 1982 velocity
decline is symptomatic ofan increased volatility
ofmoney demand whose roots may be traced to
the deregulation ofdepository institutions which,
it is argued, has blurred the distinction between
checkingaccountbalances and otherhighly-liquid
assets. In particular, allowing banks and other
depository institutions to pay intereston check-
able deposits has given these deposits some ofthe
characteristics oftraditional savings accounts. As
a result, both saving and transaction motives now
determine the public's decisions abouttheir cash
holdings, raising the possibility thatthese balances
will fluctuate more than they have in the past.
According to these economists, the 1982 episode
represents a specific instance ofthis more general
point. The 1981-82 recession caused both busi-
nesses and householdstobuild uptheirliquidity, a
typical response during periods ofheightened
economic uncertainty. Priorto deregulation, not
muchofsuch abuiIdup in precautionarybalances
would have shown up in M1 because neither cur-
rency nor traditional checking accounts (demand
deposits) paid interest. The nationwide introduc-
tion ofNOWaccounts in 1981, however, offered a
transaction account that paid interest. Conse-
quently, theunexpected rise in thedemandforM1
in 1982 occurred because the public forthe first
timeused NOWaccountsasavehicleforbuilding
up their liquidity. The mirror image ofthis unex-
pected increase in money demand was the sharp
decline in velocity in 1982.
This explanation for the velocity decline has
important implications for the conductof mone-
tary policy. Ifderegulation really has reduced the
distinction between moneyand otherhighly-liquid
assets, the publicmaymove its liquidfunds in and
outofM1 balances moreoften and for reasons that
may be harderto anticipate than before. In addi-
tion, it is suggested that Ml demand may have
become more sensitive to short-run changes in
market rates of interestwhich also might lead to
larger swings in velocity, swings thatwould be as
difficultto predict as the fluctuations in rates that.
produced them. Ifsevere enough, these height-
ened uncertainties about velocity's behavior
would make a policyoftargeting money growth
too risky.
An alternative explanation
An alternativeexplanationofthe 1982 experience
traces the large and unexpected decrease in velo-
city tothe sharp decline in interest rates thatfol-
lowed in the wake ofthe unexpected and steep
decline in the rate of inflation that began in 1981.
Declining interest rates reduce the cost ofholding
money, thereby increasing the demand for money
relative to GNP and thus lowering velocity.
Normally, this directeffect of lower interest rates
on velocity is offset by their indirecteffectofstim-
ulatingGNP, which, temporarily at least, causes
velocityto rise. However, this indirecteffect
occurs because a decline in nominal interest rates
normally represents a decrease in real, or infla-
tion-adjusted, interest rates. In 1982 this was not
the case becausethe rate ofinflation fell by roughIy
the same amount as interest rates. Thus, declining
nominal interest rates boosted money demand,
but not GNP, causing velocity to fall.
Thetwoexplanationsforthe 1982 decline in velo-
cityare notmutuallyexclusive. Some economists,
for example, believe that both factors operated to
lowervelocityduringthe 1982 episode. However,
theexplanationsdohave differentimplicationsfor
the future ofmonetary targeting. The inflation-de-
cline explanation is more reassuring for the future
ofmonetarytargeting because itdoes not imply
the behavioral link between money and GNP has
become less stable or predictable. The source of
the unexpected decline in velocity was the un-
expectedly sharp drop in inflation, rather than
instability in money demand. Although in prin-ciple episodes ofsudden declines in the rate of
inflation could recur, in practicetheyappeartobe
quite rare under normal circumstances.
Thedecline in inflation in 1975 was theonlyother
example in the post-war period ofa sudden de-
crease in the inflation rate. But it had been pre-
ceded by the sharp run-up in inflation caused by
the tripling ofoil prices in 1973-74, and itwas
widely understood that inflation would retreat
significantlyaftertheeffectofhigheroiIprices had
worked their way through the economy. Aside
from itand the 1982 episode, one has togobackto
the 1930s to find comparable instances ofsharp
and substantial declines in the inflation rate.
The road ahead
From mid 1983 until the end of 1984, the velocity
of money resumed its upward trend. However,
much ofthis snap-backprobablyreflects anormal
tendency ofvelocity to rise more quicklythan
average duringthe expansion phase ofa business
cycle. Whetherthe long-run, secular trend in
velocity is still around 3 percent remains an open
question at this point. Some economists believe
much ofthis secular rise in velocity in the thirty
years after 1950 resulted from the ratcheting upof
interest rates from business cycle to business
cycle, as inflation rates similarly moved upward.
As the cost ofholding money rose, households
and businesses soughtoutways to economize on
their money holdings relative to theirtransactions
needs, which inturn caused theacceleratingtrend
in velocity. In contrast, velocity on average de-
clined in the fifty years before 1930, duringwhich
interest rates weregenerally stable orfalling.
Ifthis explanation is correct, and ifthe economy
has finally broken outofthe nearlytwenty-year-old
pattern ofspiralling inflation, velocity may on
average increase less rapidly in the future than in
the past. Indeed, someeconomistsconjecturethat
velocity growth would be flat in aworld in which
inflation and interest rates were relatively level
overtime. This change in velocity's underlying
trend would have to be taken into accountbythe
Fed in setting its monetary targets. For example, a
seven percenttarget growth for M1 translates into
aten percentgrowth in GNPwhenvelocitygrows
at three percent a year. Ifvelocity growth were
close to zero, on the other hand, the same target
would produceonlyseven percentgrowth in total
spending. The three percentage pointdifferential
is nottrivial; itrepresents thedifferencebetween a
stagnant no-growth economyand one that grows
at its long run full employment potential
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 191,794 397 12,135 6.7
Loans and Leases1 6 173,270 383 12,761 7.9
Commercial and Industrial 52,298 112 2,826 5.7
Real estate 62,994 31 2,824 4.6
Loans to Individuals 34,041 74 6,184 22.1
Leases 5,360 - 17 372 7.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,549 - 13 - 324 - 2.7
Other Securities2 6,976 28 - 300 - 4.1
Total Deposits 192,477 -3,443 6,310 3.3
Demand Deposits 43,682 -3,688 644 1.4
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 28,899 -1,145 897 3.2
OtherTransaction Balances" 13,091 - 137 1,093 9.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,704 381 4,572 3.4
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,377 88 4,074 10.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,348 118 - 1,259 - 3.1
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 24,102 937 4,416 22.4
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change